The outbreak of Ebola hemorrhagic fever in Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo, clearly signaled an end to the days when physicians and researchers could work in relative obscurity on problems of international importance, and it provided many lessons to the international public health and scientific communities. In particular, the outbreak signaled a need for stronger infectious disease surveillance and control worldwide, for improved international preparedness to provide support when similar outbreaks occur, and for accommodating the needs of the press in providing valid information. A need for more broad-based international health regulations and electronic information systems within the World Health Organization also became evident, as did the realization that there are new and more diverse partners able to rapidly respond to international outbreaks. Finally, a need for continued and coordinated Ebola research was identified, especially as concerns development of simple and valid diagnostic tests, better patient management procedures, and identification of the natural reservoir.
The outbreak of Ebola hemorrhagic fever (EHF) in Kikwit, It was not until 13 weeks after the outbreak is thought to have begun that a local district health officer notified national Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), in 1995 caught the international community by surprise and captured the interest authorities of an outbreak of serious gastrointestinal disease occurring in the district. The report was submitted in writing, of the global media, conveying vivid images and commentary to all who had access to radio, television, and the printed press. but there was no national response. Three weeks later, the outbreak was amplified in Kikwit hospitals, and it was this It mobilized national humanitarian groups in a country where public health services were at a minimum and drew representaevent that brought the outbreak to the attention of national authorities. tives from numerous international humanitarian groups and government-supported institutions. These representatives arSubstandard hospital infection control practices (in particular, a failure in personal protection and barrier nursing) were rived soon after the declaration of the epidemic and formed an international commission, which played an important role in the immediate cause of the increased transmission within hospitals. A surgical intervention for what was diagnosed as an the management of patients and successfully contained the epidemic. As outlined in the following, many lessons were learned ''acute abdomen'' (and which was known 2 weeks later to have been EHF) was shown to have been a particular risk for from the outbreak in Kikwit. transmission of EBO virus to health workers. During this surgical intervention, barrier protection was not used by many who were in the operating theater, and latex gloves and other protec-A Need for Stronger Infectious Disease Surveillance and tive materials were in short supply.
Control
Thus, the first lesson learned was that disease-detection and Weakened infectious disease surveillance in the Kikwit area disease-response systems and basic public health practices in of the DRC permitted the 1995 outbreak of Ebola (EBO) virus developing countries must continue to be strengthened. Trainto continue through many generations and over a period of at ing and development of skills in surveillance, prevention, and least 12 weeks before it came to the attention of local health disease control are essential. At the same time, long-term meaauthorities. Retrospective tracing of contacts suggested that the sures to ensure the availability of essential materials and supoutbreak began in January 1995; a review of hospital records plies must be continued, and research on more sustainable showed that during this time, patients with hemorrhagic disease methods of ensuring universal infection-control measures must had been admitted to Kikwit hospitals, but this caused no alarm.
be promoted.
(BSL-4) pathogens had decreased in number. In fact, the origiLess obvious and negative repercussions included competition with the press for such commodities as vehicles. Prices nal specimens from Kikwit were first sent to one of the laboratories that had been important in supporting the first outbreaks for renting vehicles necessary for epidemic control from the already limited fleet more than doubled once the press arrived, of EBO, but the BSL-4 facilities had been dismantled during the 1980s because of insufficient funding. The Kikwit speciand accommodations for newly arriving members of the international commission became scarce and difficult to find. mens were thus sent on to another laboratory with BSL-4 capability; the laboratory accepted these and future specimens from On the other hand, the presence of the international press created a worldwide environment that facilitated rapid and the outbreak.
During the interval between the EBO outbreaks in the late timely mobilization of national and international experts, provision of equipment and supplies, and ú2 million dollars (US) 1970s and 1995, international stockpiles of protective equipment and supplies had become outdated and had not been for immediate epidemic control, surveillance, and research. The Kikwit outbreak clearly signaled an end to the days restocked. New supplies and equipment had to be identified and purchased before they could be shipped to the site of the when physicians and researchers worked in relative obscurity and patients were shielded from unwanted scrutiny -a bitteroutbreak; thus, their arrival in sufficient quantity was delayed. Field communication equipment was likewise in short supply, sweet lesson for the public health community. The unprecedented media attention posed a challenge to the team working and training of field workers in its use had been neglected.
Thus, the second lesson was that international preparedness, to contain the outbreak. Rather than antagonizing and competing with the media representatives at the site, the challenge including funding to strengthen existing civilian BSL-4 laboratories and to establish new ones for better geographic distribuwas to capitalize on the powerful positive role that the global media could play and to accommodate their needs without tion, must be reinforced. International revolving stockpiles of protective equipment and supplies must be maintained, and the detracting from the primary mission of patient care, epidemic control, and research. most up-to-date communications equipment and training in its use must be available.
The third lesson learned was that the public health community must recognize the powerful positive potential of the international media in mobilizing public sentiment and resources for infectious disease control, and they must accommodate their An End to Obscurity needs without detracting from the primary mission. The widespread availability of portable satellite telephones and video link-ups by 1995 made possible the instantaneous Filling the Void transfer of images and commentary to the international media from journalists and camera crews arriving in Kikwit soon after During the initial days of the epidemic in Kikwit, quarantine officers and other public health officials around the world rethe EHF epidemic was announced. This contrasted greatly with the first (simultaneous) EBO outbreaks in the DRC and Sudan quired immediate information in order to advise national public health authorities on what measures, if any, were required for in 1976, when media interest was limited to the time immediately following announcement of the outbreaks and to a time international travel. Stories in the international media were often conflicting or noncomprehensive and did not provide a several months later when the results of the outbreak investigation became available. In 1976, representatives of the news basis for making decisions; electronic mail discussion groups provided useful forums for exchange of ideas and information media were absent from the outbreak sites, and the second appearances of EBO in the DRC (1977) and Sudan (1979) on an informal basis, but they could not replace true international consensus on policy issues. attracted essentially no media interest at all.
In 1995, the first representatives of the news media arrived At the same time, the World Health Organization (WHO), the international organization charged with providing guidance in Kikwit unannounced, 2 days after the first members of the international commission arrived. The journalists and photograon policies concerning diseases of international importance, was receiving nonstop telephone inquiries during the first week phers arrived in a group on a small chartered plane and within minutes, had forcefully violated many of the protective barriers after the epidemic was reported. Many callers who sought guidance were unable to reach the switchboard. In addition, the in order to get that ''most sensational story or photograph.'' Ethical standards, such as patient consent to be filmed, were only international legislation aimed at ensuring maximum security from infectious diseases (the International Health Regulabreached; cultural sensitivity was ignored as crews filmed family members caring for the sick or burying the dead; inaccurate tions, which are administered by WHO) did not include hemorrhagic fevers. Consequently, in the absence of WHO consensus reports were dispatched; and the work of those caring for patients and containing the epidemic was disrupted. Order was guidelines, many countries imposed unnecessary travel and trade restrictions. established only when daily press briefings were begun by the international commission and camera crews were accommoThe fourth lesson was that WHO must provide guidance to policymakers through a round-the-clock authoritative source dated through prearranged filming sessions.
/ 9d49$$se10
01-05-99 13:49:59 jinfa UC: J Infect (NGOs) were new and welcome partners who played a vital role in patient management and epidemic control, strengthening both the infrastructure and the logistics requirements. derstanding of the transmissibility and epidemiology of EBO National partners. During the Kikwit outbreak, local volinfection. Medecins sans Frontières (Belgium chapter) ensured unteer groups were created soon after the outbreak was desanitation and isolation of the hospital wards, training, and tected. In particular, an association of local merchants mobisupply of protection materials to health facilities throughout lized ú$12,000 (US) to support epidemic control and patient the region. They also assisted in organizing the massive active management, an important sum considering that the annual per surveillance effort that was required for identifying EBO-incapita income in the DRC in 1995 was probably õ$220 (US).
fected persons in the community. EPICENTRE (Paris) proRepresentatives of the community participated in a rumor revided epidemiologists who played an important role in active porting system, which led to rapid identification of current and surveillance and contact tracing, and the International Federapast cases of EBO and permitted tracing of the outbreak to the tion of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies developed and index case. The local Catholic mission provided meals for widely distributed guidelines for personal protection. patients and their families; coordinated the receipt and distribuPhysicians and virologists from the Centers for Disease Contion of materials that arrived for outbreak control; and made trol and Prevention (Atlanta), the Institut Pasteur (Paris), the available aircraft, vehicles, fuel, and their radio network that South African Institute for Virology (Johannesburg, South Afconnected missions throughout the district. Use of the radio rica), and the Institute of Tropical Medicine (Antwerp, Belnetwork made it possible to collect information about the outgium), and physicians, virologists and technicians from the break and share it with major mission and government health Swedish Rescue Service Agency (Karlstad) also contributed. facilities within a 500-km radius of Kikwit. The network was They provided reinforcement activities, such as training and also crucial for early delineation of the extent of the outbreak support for national staff, direct participation in patient manand its control. It was through the local mission group that agement and isolation, and health education, sanitation and the specimens that confirmed the outbreak were first sent to hygiene, epidemiologic surveillance, and research. Europe.
Finally, epidemiologists and technical officers from WHO The local Red Cross chapter also played an essential role in (Geneva and Brazzaville and Kinshasa, DCR) reinforced nathe control of the epidemic by providing public education, tional coordination and logistics support to the international patient transport, and safe burial. The dedication of the Red commission at the epidemic site. In addition, they provided Cross volunteers was untiring, and tragically, 3 volunteers died daily information briefings for local and international media after becoming infected with EBO before protective clothing and mobilized funds and experts for national epidemic control was available. The local branch of Oxford Famine Relief was and postepidemic reinforcement of surveillance and epidemic an equally important partner, providing health education and preparedness. Table 1 shows the members of the commission ensuring that messages about the need to isolate patients and that was created from the international NGOs and institutions avoid contact with corpses were widely diffused to the entire participating at Kikwit and the times of their arrival at the site. population through their network in the region. Finally, local
The fifth lesson was that an increasing number of internamedical students whose schooling had been disrupted by the tional partners are capable of outbreak investigation and conoutbreak were trained, and they conducted active surveillance trol, and each has an important and sometimes unique place in and containment activities in 20 teams of 2 students each.
the international response to epidemics. On-site and internaInternational partners. The response of the international tional measures and information must be coordinated to maxNGOs and government institutions also played an important imize efforts aimed at early detection of, prevention of, and response to future epidemics. role in controlling the Kikwit outbreak and improving the un-
A Need for Continued Research
EBO infection are being studied: They include procedures on skin snips from persons who died with a case definition of The studies conducted during the course of epidemic control hemorrhagic fever (see Zaki S, et al., this supplement) . Howin Kikwit and the rejuvenated interest among the scientific ever, this promising procedure does not permit early patient community after the outbreak contributed to a better underdiagnosis and patient triage during an outbreak. A simple and standing of the epidemiology of the EBO virus. Unpublished safe procedure for inactivating blood specimens at the time of data collected between the 1976 and 1995 epidemics were collection and a simple laboratory test for diagnosis of acute reexamined in several international forums, and heightened and convalescent infection from such specimens are needed. awareness and surveillance for EBO in other African countries Such a test would be necessary if convalescent or hyperimmune subsequently contributed to the early identification of other serum (or both) and antivirals are to be studied during future EBO outbreaks. However, further work is required to address outbreaks. A simple laboratory test would also facilitate surseveral issues that remain.
veillance programs and provide more timely results. First, there is a need to determine optimal patient manageThird, the reservoir for EBO virus in nature is not known, ment procedures. Patient management was particularly difficult despite at least five studies to identify an infected animal or during the Kikwit outbreak, and although treatment with convainsect in nature. New approaches for ecologic studies, such as lescent serum was attempted, no firm conclusions can be made obtaining clues from EBO-infected nonhuman primates (e.g., about its efficacy. Antiviral therapy was not tried because rethe chimpanzee), are required before a decision is made consults of previous studies in animal models suggested that excerning which animals or insects to sample. isting antivirals, such as ribavirin, were not effective. Case
The final lesson was that despite the knowledge gained durfatality rates remained high, as in previous outbreaks. Further ing and since the Kikwit outbreak, EBO virus remains a public research could help to determine the efficacy of convalescent health challenge for surveillance and control in tropical Africa. serum.
New diagnostic technologies are required, as are research proSecond, there is a need for the development of new diagnostocols for controlled trials of hyperimmune serum and antiviral tic tools. The lack of a safe and simple-to-use field diagnostic drugs for use in future outbreaks. New approaches for the test made laboratory confirmation of patient diagnosis in Kikwit identification of the EBO reservoir must be attempted so that the cause(s) of reemergence can be understood and prevented. problematic. New laboratory procedures for the diagnosis of
